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Abstract
To select a subset of samples or “winners” from a population of candidates, order sampling
[20] and the k-unit Myerson auction [17] share a common scheme: assign a (random) score to
each candidate, then select the k candidates with the highest scores. We study a generalization of
both order sampling and Myerson’s allocation rule, called winner-selecting dice. The setting for
winner-selecting dice is similar to auctions with feasibility constraints: candidates have random
types drawn from independent prior distributions, and the winner set must be feasible subject to
certain constraints. Dice (distributions over scores) are assigned to each type, and winners are
selected to maximize the sum of the dice rolls, subject to the feasibility constraints. We examine
the existence of winner-selecting dice that implement prescribed probabilities of winning (i.e.,
an interim rule) for all types.
Our first result shows that when the feasibility constraint is a matroid, then for any feasible
interim rule, there always exist winner-selecting dice that implement it. Unfortunately, our
proof does not yield an efficient algorithm for constructing the dice. In the special case of a
1-uniform matroid, i.e., only one winner can be selected, we give an efficient algorithm that
constructs winner-selecting dice for any feasible interim rule. Furthermore, when the types of
the candidates are drawn in an i.i.d. manner and the interim rule is symmetric across candidates,
unsurprisingly, an algorithm can efficiently construct symmetric dice that only depend on the
type but not the identity of the candidate.
One may ask whether we can extend our result to “second-order” interim rules, which not
only specify the winning probability of a type, but also the winning probability conditioning on
each other candidate’s type. We show that our result does not extend, by exhibiting an instance
of Bayesian persuasion whose optimal scheme is equivalent to a second-order interim rule, but
which does not admit any dice-based implementation.
1 Introduction
Economic design often features scenarios in which choices must be made based on stochastic inputs.
In auction design, bidders drawn from a population interact with an auction mechanism, and the
mechanism must then choose winners and losers of the auction. In information structure design,
a principal observes information pertinent to the various actions available to one or more decision
makers, and must use this information to recommend actions to the decision makers. In such
settings, an important framing device is the notion of an interim rule (also called a reduced form)
of an (ex-post) winner selection rule, summarizing the probability for each candidate to be selected.
We focus on the simplest and most natural class of such decision making scenarios, one which
includes auctions and Bayesian persuasion [12] as special cases. In a winner selection environment,
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there is a set of candidates C, each equipped with a random attribute known as its type. A winner
selection rule is a randomized function (or algorithm) which maps each profile of types, one per
candidate, to a choice of winning candidates, subject to the requirement that the set of winners must
belong to a specified family I ⊆ 2C of feasible sets. The winner selection rule is also referred to as an
ex-post rule since it specifies the winning probabilities conditioned on every realized type profile. In
auctions, candidates correspond to bidders, and a winner selection rule is an allocation rule of the
auction. In Bayesian persuasion, candidates correspond to actions available to a decision maker,
and a winner selection rule corresponds to a persuasion scheme used by a principal to recommend
one of the actions to the decision maker. We restrict our attention to winner selection scenarios in
which the types of different candidates are independently distributed.
We distinguish two classes of interim rules: first-order and second-order. The former is the
traditional notion from auction theory, while the latter is the notion better suited for persuasion.
A first-order interim rule specifies, for each candidate i and type t of candidate i, the conditional
probability of i winning given that his type is t. A second-order interim rule specifies more in-
formation: for each pair of candidates i, j and type t of candidate j, it specifies the conditional
probability of i winning given that j has type t. First-order interim rules, when combined with a
payment rule, suffice for evaluating the welfare, revenue, and incentive-compatibility of a single-
item auction. For Bayesian persuasion, second-order interim rules are needed for evaluating the
incentive constraints of a persuasion scheme.
Our motivation for studying winner selection at this level of generality stems from the success
of Myerson’s [17] famous and elegant characterization of revenue-optimal single-item auctions when
bidder type distributions are independent. In that special case, Myerson showed that the optimal
single-item auction features a particularly structured winner-selection rule: each type is associated
with a virtual value, and given a profile of reported types, the rule selects the bidder with the
highest (non-negative) virtual value as the winner.
Interestingly, order sampling [20] works in a similar way as Myerson’s auction, in the special
case when the feasible sets are sets of k or fewer candidates, and each candidate has only one
type. Order sampling assigns each candidate a random score variable (a die). The winners are
the candidates with the k highest score variables. In the language of order sampling, virtual value
functions define a single-sided die for each type. Unlike Myerson’s auction, there is no notion of
“revenue” or “incentive constraints” in order sampling. The task is simply to find dice that will
induce a prescribed first-order interim rule.
As a generalization of order sampling and Myerson’s virtual-value approach, a dice-based winner-
selection rule assigns each type a die, and selects the feasible set of winners maximizing the sum of
the dice rolls. We explore the extent to which dice-based rules are applicable beyond single-parameter
auctions or single-type environments, to winner selection with independent type distributions under
more complex constraints. In particular, we examine whether dice-based winner-selection rules
exist for winner selection subject to matroid constraints and for Bayesian persuasion.
1.1 Our Results
As mentioned previously, all of our results are restricted to settings in which the candidates’ type
distributions are independent. It follows from Myerson’s characterization that every first-order
interim rule corresponding to some optimal auction admits a dice-based implementation.1 Our
1As we show in the appendix, there are interim rules which are not optimal for any auction.
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main result (in Section 3) is an existential proof showing that every feasible first-order interim
rule with respect to a matroid constraint admits a dice-based implementation. This illustrates
that the structure revealed by Myerson’s characterization is more general, and applies to other
settings in which only first-order interim information is relevant. For example, single-item auctions
with (public or private) budgets are such a setting (see, e.g., [19]). Our result also provides a
generalization of order sampling from the k-winner setting to the general matroid, multi-type
setting.
Beyond the existential proof of dice-based implementations, we show (in Section 4) that for
single-winner environments, an algorithm can construct the dice-based rule efficiently. When the
types are identically distributed, we also constructively show (in Section 5) that every first-order
interim rule which is symmetric across candidates admits a symmetric dice implementation; i.e.,
different candidates have the same die for the same type. This is consistent with Myerson’s sym-
metric characterization of optimal single-item auctions with i.i.d. bidders, and generalizes it to any
other first-order single-winner selection setting in which candidates are identical. Single-item auc-
tions with identically distributed budgeted bidders are such a setting, and a symmetric dice-based
implementation of the optimal allocation rule was already known from [19].
For single-winner cases, we also show the converse direction: how to efficiently compute the
first-order interim rule of a given dice-based winner selection rule. In effect, these results show
that collections of dice are a computationally equivalent description of single-winner first-order
interim information. This implies a kind of equivalence between the two dominant approaches for
mechanism design: the Myersonian approach based on virtual values (i.e., dice), and the Borderian
approach based on optimization over interim rules.
In an attempt to leverage the same kinds of insights for Bayesian persuasion, we examine (in
Sections 6 and 7) the dice implementability of second-order interim rules. When the candidate
type distributions are non-identical, we show an impossibility result. We construct an instance
of Bayesian persuasion with independently distributed non-identical actions, and show that no
optimal persuasion scheme for this instance can be implemented by dice. Since second-order interim
rules are sufficient for evaluating the objective and constraints of Bayesian persuasion, this implies
that there exist second-order interim rules which are not dice-implementable. This rules out the
Myersonian approach for characterizing and computing optimal schemes for Bayesian persuasion
with independent non-identical actions, complementing the negative result of [8] which rules out
the Borderian approach for the same problem.
Our impossibility result disappears when the actions are i.i.d., since second-order interim rules
collapse to first-order interim rules in symmetric settings. In particular, as we show in Section 7,
our results for first-order interim rules, combined with those of [8], imply that Bayesian persuasion
with i.i.d. actions admits an optimal dice-based scheme, which can be computed efficiently.
1.2 Additional Discussion of Related Work
Myerson [17] was the first to characterize revenue-optimal single-item auctions; this characterization
extends to single-parameter mechanism design settings more generally (see, e.g., [11]). The (first-
order) interim rule of an auction, also known as its reduced form, was first studied by Maskin and
Riley [14] and Matthews [15]. The inequalities characterizing the space of feasible interim rules were
described by Border [3, 4]. Border’s analytically tractable characterization of feasible interim rules
has served as a fruitful framework for mechanism design, since an optimal auction can be viewed as
the solution of a linear program over the space of interim rules. Moreover, this characterization has
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enabled the design of efficient algorithms for recognizing interim rules and optimizing over them,
by Cai et al. [5] and Alaei et al. [2]. This line of work has served as a foundation for much of the
recent literature on Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design in multi-parameter settings.
It is important to contrast our dice-based rule with the characterization of Cai et al. [5]. In
particular, the results of Cai et al. [5] imply that every first-order interim rule can be efficiently
implemented as a distribution over virtual value maximizers. In our language, this implies the
existence of an efficiently computable dice-based implementation in which the dice may be arbitrarily
correlated. Our result, in contrast, efficiently computes a family of independent dice implementing
any given first-order interim rule in single-winner settings, and shows the existence of a dice-based
rule in matroid settings. This is consistent with Myerson’s characterization, in which virtual values
are drawn independently.
Alaei et al. [2] also studied winner-selection environments, under the different name “service
based environments.” For single-winner settings, they proposed a mechanism called stochastic
sequential allocation (SSA). The mechanism also implements any feasible first-order interim rule, by
creating a token of winning and transferring the token sequentially from one candidate to another,
with probabilities defined by an efficiently computed transition table. Dice can be considered as
the special case of SSA in which the transition probabilities are independent of the current owner
of the token.
As another motivation for our focus on dice-based rules, order sampling studies how to sample
k winners from n candidates with given inclusion probabilities (i.e., implement an interim rule), by
assigning a random score variable (die) to each candidate. Rose´n [20] showed that parameterized
Pareto distributions can be used to implement a given interim rule asymptotically. Aires et al.
[1] proved the existence of an order sampling scheme that exactly implements any feasible interim
rule. Our existential proof is a generalization of the proof of [1] to settings with multiple types and
matroid constraints.
The Bayesian persuasion model is due to Kamenica and Gentzkow [12], and is the most in-
fluential model in the general space of information structure design (see the survey by Dughmi
[7] for references). Bayesian persuasion was examined algorithmically by Dughmi and Xu [8],
who observed its connection to auction theory and interim rules, and examined the computational
complexity of optimal schemes through the lens of optimization over interim rules.
Of particular relevance to our work is the negative result of Dughmi and Xu [8] for Bayesian per-
suasion with independent non-identical actions: it is #P-hard to compute the interim rule (first- or
second-order) of the optimal scheme, or more simply even the sender’s optimal utility. Most notable
about this result is what it does not rule out: an algorithm implementing the optimal persuasion
scheme “on the fly,” in the sense that it efficiently samples the optimal scheme’s (randomized)
recommendation when given as input the profile of action types. Stated differently, the negative
result of Dughmi and Xu [8] merely rules out the Borderian approach for this problem, leaving
other approaches — such as the Myersonian one — viable as a means of obtaining an efficient “on
the fly” implementation. This would not be unprecedented: Gopalan et al. [9] exhibit a simple
single-parameter auction setting for which the optimal interim rule is #P hard to compute, yet
Myerson’s virtual values can be sampled efficiently and used to efficiently implement the optimal
auction. Our negative result in Section 7 rules out such good fortune for Bayesian persuasion with
independent non-identical actions: there does not exist a (Myersonian) dice-based implementation
of the optimal persuasion scheme in general.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Winner Selection
Consider choosing a set of winners from among n candidates. Each candidate i has a type ti ∈ Ti,
drawn independently from a distribution fi. A winner-selection rule A maps each type profile t =
(t1, . . . , tn), possibly randomly, to one of a prescribed family of feasible sets I ⊆ 2[n]. When i ∈ A(t),
we refer to i as a winning candidate, and to ti as his winning type. Writing f = f1×· · ·× fn for the
(independent) joint type distribution, we also refer to (f,I) as the winner-selection environment.
When I is the family of singletons, as in the setting of the single item auction, we call (f,I) a
single-winner environment.
This general setup captures the allocation rules of general auctions with independent unit-
demand buyers, albeit without specifying payment rules or imposing incentive constraints. More-
over, it captures Bayesian persuasion with independent action payoffs, albeit without enforcing
persuasiveness (also called obedience) constraints.
2.2 Matroids
In this paper, we focus on settings in which the feasible sets I are the independent sets of a matroid.
We use the standard definition of a matroid M as a pair (E,I), where E is the ground set and
I ⊆ 2E is a family of so-called independent sets, satisfying the three matroid axioms. We also
use the standard definitions of a circuit and rank function rM : 2
E → N. The restriction M|S
of M = (E,I) to some S ⊆ E is the matroid (E,I ∩ 2S).2 For details on matroids, we refer the
reader to Oxley [18].
A matroid M = (E,I) is separable if it is a direct sum of two matroids M1 = (E1,I1) and
M2 = (E2,I2). Namely, E = E1 ⊎ E2, I = {A ∪ B | A ∈ I1, B ∈ I2}. Note that if M is non-
separable, then rM(E) < |E|; otherwise M is the direct sum of singleton matroids. We use the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Whitney [21]) (1) When M = (E,I) is a non-separable matroid, for every a, b ∈
E, there is a circuit containing both a and b. (2) Any separable matroid M is a direct sum of two
or more non-separable matroids called the components of M.
In most of the remainder of the paper, we focus on winner selection environments (f,I) where
I is the family of independent sets of a matroid M. We therefore also use (f,M) to denote the
environment.
2.3 Interim Rules and Border’s Theorem
A (first-order) interim rule x specifies the winning probability xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ [n], t ∈ Ti
in an environment (f,I). More precisely, we say that a winner-selection rule A implements the
interim rule x for a prior f if it satisfies the following: if the type profile t = (t1, . . . , tn) is drawn
from the prior distribution f = f1 × · · · × fn, then Pr[i ∈ A(t) | ti = t] = xi(t). An interim
rule is feasible (or implementable) within an environment (f,I) if there is a winner-selection rule
implementing it that always outputs an independent set of I.
2Note that we deviate slightly from the standard definition in that we do not restrict the ground set.
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2.3.1 Border’s theorem and implications for single-winner environments
The following theorem characterizes the space of feasible interim rules for single-winner settings.
Theorem 2 (Border [3, 4]) An interim rule x is feasible for a single-winner setting if and only
if for all possible type subsets S1 ⊆ T1, S2 ⊆ T2, . . . , Sn ⊆ Tn,
n∑
i=1
∑
t∈Si
fi(t)xi(t) ≤ 1−
n∏
i=1
1−∑
t∈Si
fi(t)
 . (1)
The following result leverages Theorem 2 to show that efficient algorithms exist for checking
the feasibility of an interim rule, and for implementing a feasible interim rule.
Theorem 3 ([5, 2]) Given explicitly represented priors f1, . . . , fn and an interim rule x in a
single-winner setting, the feasibility of x can be checked in time polynomial in the number of candi-
dates and types. Moreover, given a feasible interim rule x, an algorithm can find a winner-selection
rule implementing x in time polynomial in the number of candidates and types.
In our efficient construction for single-winner settings, we utilize a structural result which shows
that checking only a subset of Border’s constraints suffices [3, 16, 5]. This subset of constraints can
be identified efficiently.
Theorem 4 (Theorem 4 of [5]) An interim rule x is feasible for a single-winner setting if and
only if for all possible α ∈ [0, 1], the sets Si(α) = {t ∈ Ti | xi(t) > α} satisfy the following Border’s
constraint:
n∑
i=1
∑
t∈Si(α)
fi(t)xi(t) ≤ 1−
n∏
i=1
1− ∑
t∈Si(α)
fi(t)
 .
When the candidates’ type distributions are i.i.d., i.e., Ti and fi are the same for all candidates
i, it is typically sufficient to restrict attention to symmetric interim rules. For such rules, xi(t) is
equal for all candidates i. In the i.i.d. setting, we therefore notationally omit the dependence on the
candidate and let T refer to the common type set of all candidates, f to the candidates’ (common)
type distribution, and x(t) to the probability that a particular candidate wins conditioned on having
type t. In the i.i.d. setting, only the symmetric constraints from Theorem 2 suffice to characterize
feasibility [3]; namely,
n ·
∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t) ≤ 1−
(
1−
∑
t∈S
f(t)
)n
, (2)
for all S ⊆ T . Theorem 4 then implies that it suffices to check Inequality (2) for sets of the form
S(α) = {t ∈ T : x(t) > α} with α ∈ [0, 1].
2.3.2 Border’s Theorem for matroid environments
For general settings with matroid constraints, Alaei et al. [2] established the following generalized
“Border’s Theorem.”
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Theorem 5 (Theorem 7 of [2]) Let ν map each type t to the (unique) candidate i with t ∈ Ti.
An interim rule x is feasible within an environment (f,M) if and only if for all possible type subsets
S1 ⊆ T1, S2 ⊆ T2, . . . , Sn ⊆ Tn,
n∑
i=1
∑
t∈Si
fi(t)xi(t) ≤ Et∼f [rM(ν(t ∩ S))] ,
where S =
⋃n
i=1 Si.
In later sections, we omit the function ν, and for any type set S just write rM(S) instead of
rM(ν(S)).
2.4 Winner-Selecting Dice
We study winner-selection rules based on dice, as a generalization of order sampling to multiple
types and general constraints. A dice-based rule fixes, for each type t ∈ Ti, a distribution Di,t
over real numbers, which we call a die. Given as input the type profile t = (t1, . . . , tn), the rule
independently draws a score vi ∼ Di,ti for each candidate i by “rolling his die;” it then selects
the feasible set of candidates maximizing the sum of scores as the winner set, breaking ties with a
predefined rule. In this paper, we will mainly discuss matroid feasibility constraints, for which a
feasible set maximizing the sum of scores can be found by a simple greedy algorithm: candidates
are added to the winner set in decreasing order of their scores, breaking ties uniformly at random,
as long as the new winner set is still an independent set of the matroid and their scores are positive.
When candidates have the same type sets, we call a dice-based rule symmetric if Di,t is the same
for all i.
Myerson’s optimal auction is a dice-based winner-selection rule. In Myerson’s nomenclature, vi
is candidate i’s virtual value, and Di,t is a single-sided die with the virtual value.
Let T be the set of all types of all candidates and D = (Dt)t∈T be a vector of dice, one per type.
Given an interim rule x, and a winner-selection environment (f,I), we say that D implements x,
or D describes winner-selecting dice for x in (f,I), if the dice-based rule given by D implements x
within the environment (f,I).
2.5 Second-order Interim Rules
A (first-order) interim rule, as defined in Section 2.3, specifies, for each candidate i, the conditional
type distribution of i in the event that i is chosen as the winner. We define a second-order interim
rule3 which maintains strictly more information, as needed for describing the incentive constraints
of Bayesian persuasion. Such a rule specifies, for each pair of candidates i and i′ (where i′ may or
may not be equal to i), the conditional type distribution of i′ in the event that i is chosen as the
winner. Formally, a second-order interim rule X specifies xi,i′,t ∈ [0, 1] for each pair of candidates
i, i′ ∈ [n], and type t ∈ Ti′ . We say that a winner-selection rule A implements X for a prior f
if it satisfies the following: if the type profile t = (t1, . . . , tn) is drawn from the prior distribution
f = f1× · · ·× fn, then Pr[i ∈ A(t) | ti′ = t] = xi,i′,t. A second-order interim rule is feasible if there
is a winner selection rule implementing it.
3Our notion of second-order interim rules is different from the notion defined in [6]. Because Cai et al. [6] consider
correlation in types, their notion of second-order interim rules is aimed at capturing the allocation dependencies
arising through such type correlation, rather than solely through the mechanism’s choice.
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3 Existence of Dice Implementation for Matroids
In this section, we prove our first theorem:
Theorem 6 Let (f,M) be a matroid winner selection-environment with a total of m types, and
let x be an interim rule that is feasible within (f,M). There exist winner-selecting dice D, each of
which has at most m+ 1 faces, which implement x.
The proof consists of two parts. First, we generalize the result of [1], which showed the existence
of continuous winner-selecting dice for feasible interim rules for a k-uniform matroid with fixed
types, to general matroids and multiple types. Second, we convert the continuous dice to dice with
at most m+ 1 faces each, while keeping the interim probabilities unchanged.
3.1 Continuous Winner-Selecting Dice
Theorem 7 Let M be a matroid, and x a feasible interim rule within the winner-selection envi-
ronment (f,M). There exist winner-selecting dice D over R that implement x in (f,M).
We assume without loss of generality that the candidates’ type sets are disjoint, and use T =⊎n
i=1 Ti to denote the set of all types. We use f(t) and x(t) as shorthand for fi(t) and xi(t),
where i = ν(t) is the candidate for whom t ∈ Ti. Moreover, given a set of types S ⊆ T , we write
Si = S ∩ Ti. Recall the Border constraints
n∑
i=1
∑
t∈Si
fi(t)xi(t) ≤ R(S), (3)
where R(S) = Et∼f [rM(t ∩ S)] is the expected rank of types in S which show up, a submodular
function over the type set T . The Border constraints can therefore be interpreted as follows: An
interim rule x : T → [0, 1] is feasible for f and M if and only if x˜ is in the polymatroid given
by R(S), where x˜(t) := f(t)x(t). Equivalently, x is feasible if and only if the submodular slack
function σ(S) = R(S)−∑t∈S f(t)x(t) is non-negative everywhere.
When x is feasible, we call a set S ⊆ T tight for (f,x,M) if the Border constraint (3) corre-
sponding to S is tight at x, i.e.,
∑n
i=1
∑
t∈Si
f(t)x(t) = R(S). By definition, S = ∅ is always tight.
The family of tight sets, being the family of minimizers of the submodular slack function, forms a
lattice: the intersection and the union of two tight sets is a tight set.
Remark 8 The tightness of a set S means that the expected number of winners from S equals the
expected rank of types in S which show up. In other words, S is tight if and only if a maximum
independent subset of t ∩ S is always selected as winners.
By Remark 8, the types in minimal non-empty tight sets need to be treated preferentially,
i.e., assigned higher faces on their dice, compared to types outside them. Because they play such
an important role, we define them as barrier sets. Formally, we define the set of active types
T+ = {t ∈ T : f(t)x(t) > 0} to be the types who win with positive probability. Barrier sets are
subsets of T+. If there is at least one non-empty tight set of active types, we define the barrier
sets as the (inclusion-wise) minimal such sets. Otherwise, we designate the entire set T+ of active
types as the unique barrier set.
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To prove Theorem 7, we first assume that the matroidM is non-separable. Separable matroids
will be handled in the proof of Theorem 7 by combining the dice of their non-separable components.
Because barrier sets get precedence, we first show how to construct dice for barrier sets with
Lemma 9. Once we have dice for barrier sets, we can repeatedly “peel off” the tight sets and
combine their dice, which is captured in Lemma 13. We start with the existence of dice for barrier
sets:
Lemma 9 Let M be a non-separable matroid, and x > 0 a feasible interim rule within the winner-
selection environment (f,M). Let S be a barrier set for (f,x,M), and define xS to be (x(t))t∈S .
There exists a vector of distributions D = (Dt)t∈S over R, such that D implements xS in (f,M|S).
Without loss of generality, assume that the barrier set S contains K types, and number them
by 1, 2, . . . ,K.
Proof. When | ν(S)| = 1 and S is tight, all types in S belong to the same candidate, so there is no
competition between candidates. Because of the tightness of S, we can simply assign a single-sided
die with face value 1 to each type in S. Thus in the proof, we assume that either there is more than
one candidate with a type in S or that S is not tight.4 In both cases, this implies that x(t) < 1 for
all t ∈ S. For if x(t) = 1, the singleton {t} would be a proper tight subset of S, which contradicts
the assumption that S is a barrier set.
We create Dt from any continuous distribution
5 D with support [0,∞). For each type t, we
assign a parameter θt > 0. Also, we choose a global parameter τ . To sample from Dt, we draw a
primitive roll vt ∼ D and output θtvt − τ .
We define gt(τ, θ1, . . . , θK) to be the interim probability of type t winning in the environment
(f,M|S) when the winner-selecting dice Dt with parameters θt and τ are used for t ∈ S. Each gt
is continuous in all of its parameters. Using θS = (θt)t∈S for short, consider the following system
of equations with variables θS :∑
t∈S
x(t)gt(τ,θS) =
∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t) (4)
gt(τ,θS) = x(t), for all t ∈ [K]. (5)
The objective of the proof is to show that the system of equations (5) admits a solution. This
solution will directly induce a dice system that implements x for types in S. Notice that the
system is redundant: Equation (4) is implied by the Equations (5). Throughout the proof, we use
αi to denote the prefix (τ, θ1, . . . , θi) and βi to denote the suffix of parameters (θi, θi+1, . . . , θn). In
particular, α0 = τ . We prove the following inductively for k = 1, . . . ,K:
For any positive suffix βk > 0, there is a prefix αk−1 so that (αk−1(βk),βk) satisfies
the first k equations in the system (4)-(5).
Applying the claim with k = K, for every positive θK , there is a solution that satisfies the first
K equations. Because of the redundancy of the system, satisfying the first K equations guarantees
that the last equation is also satisfied.
4Recall that S could be the (possibly non-tight) barrier set of all active types, if no non-empty set is tight.
5For example, one can use an exponential distribution.
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For the base case k = 1, consider an arbitrary positive β1 = θS . We need to prove the existence
of a τ such that
∑
t∈S f(t)gt(τ,θS) =
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t). When τ = 0, all types get non-negative die
rolls. Therefore, a maximum independent subset of t ∩ S is always selected. Thus, S is tight at
(gt(0,θS))t∈S , i.e.,
∑
t∈S f(t)gt(0,θS) = R(S) ≥
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t). On the other hand, as τ increases,
the probability that all die rolls are negative goes to 1, meaning that in the limit, no agent wins.
Thus, limτ→∞ gt(τ,θS) = 0. Furthermore, each gt(τ,θS) strictly and continuously decreases with
τ . Because 0 <
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t) ≤ R(S), by the Intermediate Value Theorem, for every θS , there is a
unique τ such that
∑
t∈S f(t)gt(τ,θS) =
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t). We denote this unique τ by h0(θS); notice
that h0(θS) is a continuous function of θS . When S is a tight barrier set, i.e., R(S) =
∑
t f(t)x(t),
the equation is satisfied for τ = 0, so h0(θS) = 0. This establishes the base case k = 1 of the
induction hypothesis.
For the inductive step, fix an arbitrary k ≥ 1, and let βk+1 > 0 be arbitrary. For any fixed θk >
0, by induction hypothesis, there is a unique αk−1(θk,βk+1) such that (αk−1(θk,βk+1), θk,βk+1)
satisfies the first k equations of (4)–(5). Lemma 10 below shows that there is a unique θk = hk(βk+1)
such that (αk(hk(βk+1),βk+1), hk(βk+1),βk+1) satisfies the first k + 1 equations of (4)-(5). The
inductive claim now follows by defining αk+1(βk+1) = (αk(hk(βk+1),βk+1), hk(βk+1)).
Lemma 10 Fix any feasible x. For every k and suffix βk+1, there is a unique θk ∈ (0,∞) such
that gk(αk−1(θk,βk+1), θk,βk+1) = x(k).
The proof of Lemma 10 is based on large part on the following monotonicity properties:
Lemma 11 Assume that S contains types of more than one candidate or is not tight. For any
t ≥ k, consider gt(αk−1(θk,βk+1), θk,βk+1) as a function of θi, for i ≥ k. The function gt satisfies
the following properties:
1. It is weakly decreasing in θi, for all i 6= t, i ≥ k.
2. It is strictly increasing in θt.
Lemma 12 If ν(t) 6= ν(i), then gt(θS) is strictly decreasing in θi. If in addition i ≥ k and t ≥ k,
then gt(αk−1(βk),βk) is also strictly decreasing in θi.
For notational convenience, we define the shorthand gt(θk,βk+1) := gt(αk−1(θk,βk+1), θk,βk+1).
Furthermore, for fixed βk+1 (which will be clear from the context), we define ht(θk) to be the t
th
component of αk−1(θk,βk+1)t, for any t < k.
Proof of Lemma 10. As we did in the proof of Lemma 9 for the base case of the induction
claim, we will examine the limits of gk(θk,βk+1) as θk → 0 and θk → ∞. By doing so, we will
establish that x(k) lies between the two limits. Then, using the continuity and strict monotonicity
(by Lemma 11) of gk(θk,βk+1), the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there is a unique θk
satisfying gk(θk,βk+1) = x(k).
• To compute limθk→∞ gk(θk,βk+1), consider the set of types A = {t < k | limθk→∞ ht(θk) =
∞}. As θk →∞, with probability approaching 1, A ∪ {k} will dominate all other types. We
distinguish two cases, based on whether limθk→∞ h0(θS) is finite or not.
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– If limθk→∞ h0(θk) 6=∞, the parameter τ will be finite in the limit. Therefore, a maximum
independent subset of A∪{k} will be selected as winners, implying that A∪{k} is tight
in the limit. Because αk−1(θk,βk+1) ensures that the first k equations of (4)–(5) are
satisfied, each type t ∈ A wins with probability f(t)x(t). Because A ∪ {k} is tight,
limθk→∞ f(k)gk(θk,βk+1) = R(A ∪ {k}) −
∑
t∈A f(t)x(t). From the Border constraint
for the set A ∪ {k}, f(k)x(k) +∑t∈A f(t)x(t) < R(A ∪ {k}); otherwise A ∪ {k} ( S
would be a tight set, contradicting that S is a barrier set. Rearranging, we have shown
that limθk→∞ f(k)gk(θk,βk+1) > f(k)x(k).
– If limθk→∞ h0(θk) =∞, then all types t > k will get negative die rolls with probability ap-
proaching 1, so limθk→∞ gt(θk,βk+1) = 0 for all types t > k. Thus, limθk→∞ f(k)gk(θk,βk+1)+∑
t<k f(t)x(t) =
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t), i.e., limθk→∞ f(k)gk(θk,βk+1) =
∑
t≥k f(t)x(t) > f(k)x(k),
because all types in a barrier set are active by definition.
• To compute limθk→0 gk(θk,βk+1), define the type set A = {1 ≤ t < k | limθk→0 ht(θk) >
0} ∪ {k + 1, . . . ,K}. As θk → 0, with probability approaching 1, A will dominate all other
types because for t /∈ A, ht(θk) goes to 0. Again, we distinguish two cases, based on whether
limθk→∞ h0(θk) = 0 or not.
– If limθk→∞ h0(θk) = 0, then in the limit, a maximum independent subset of A must
always be chosen as winners, so A approaches tightness. Again, αk−1(θk,βk+1) ensures
that gt(θk,βk+1) = x(t) for t < k, so we have limθk→0
∑
t>k f(t)gt(θk,βk+1) = R(A) −∑
t∈A,t<k f(t)x(t). Combined with
∑
t≥k f(t)gt(θk,βk+1) =
∑
t≥k f(t)x(t), which is also
ensured by αk−1(θk,βk), we obtain that
lim
θk→0
f(k)gk(θk,βk+1) =
∑
t≥k
f(t)x(t)−
R(A)− ∑
t∈A,t<k
f(t)x(t)
 .
Rearranging the Border constraint corresponding to A ⊆ S \ {k} gives us that 0 >∑
t>k f(t)x(t)−
(
R(A)−∑t∈A,t<k f(t)x(t)) because A ( S is not tight. Adding f(k)x(k)
on both sides, we get f(k)x(k) >
∑
t≥k f(t)x(t)−
(
R(A)−∑t∈A,t<k f(t)x(t)). Finally,
canceling out f(k), we obtain that x(k) > limθk→0 gk(θk,βk+1).
– If limθk→0 h0(θk) > 0, as θk → 0, type k will get a negative roll with probability ap-
proaching 1, so limθk→0 gk(θk,βk+1) = 0 < x(k).
In summary, we have shown that limθk→0 gk(θk,βk+1) < x(k) < limθk→∞ gk(θk,βk+1). Because
gk(βk) is continuous and monotone in θk, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a unique
θk such that gk(βk) = x(k).
In the proofs for Lemmas 11 and 12, we will often want to analyze the effect of keeping θi for
all i 6= t unchanged, while changing θt to θ′t. Thereto, we always consider the following coupling
of dice rolls in the two scenarios, which we call primitive-roll coupling for t: all dice will obtain
the same primitive rolls v under the two scenarios, but scale them differently. More precisely, we
consider the rolls (θivi − τ)i∈S and (θ′ivi − τ ′)i∈S , for any given primitive rolls v, where θ′i = θi for
i 6= t, i ≥ k. Recall that all θi for i < k are functions of βk.
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Proof of Part 1 of Lemma 11. To show that gt(θk,βk+1) is weakly decreasing in θi for all
i ≥ k, i 6= t, we again use induction on k. The induction hypothesis is the following:
1. Each entry of αk(βk+1) is weakly increasing in θi for i > k.
2. gt(βk+1) is weakly decreasing in θi for i 6= t, i > k.
We begin with the base case k = 0. The first part of the base case — that α0(θS) is weakly
increasing in θi — has been shown in the proof of Lemma 9. To prove the second part of the base
case, we use primitive-roll coupling for i with θi < θ
′
i. For every scenario with primitive rolls v in
which t is not a winner with θS , we show that t cannot become a winner with θ
′
S .
• Increasing θi to θ′i can only (weakly) increase the threshold τ = α0(θS), by the first part of
the base case.
• Let A be the set of types with rolls higher than the roll of type t when the rolls are derived
from v using θS . Since t is not winning, we have
0 = rM(A ∪ {t})− rM(A) ≥ rM(A ∪ {t, i}) − rM (A ∪ {i}).
The inequality is due to the submodularity of the matroid rank function, and shows formally
that (potentially) adding i to the set of types with higher rolls than t cannot help t become
a winner.
For the induction step, consider some k ≥ 1 and fix a βk+1. By the induction hypothesis, each
entry of αk−1(θk,βk+1) is weakly increasing in θi for i ≥ k, and gt(θk,βk+1) is weakly decreasing
in θi for i 6= t, i ≥ k.
• We first show that each entry of αk(βk+1) is weakly increasing in θi for i > k. The key is
component k of αk(βk+1). By the second part of the induction hypothesis, applied with t = k,
gk(αk−1(θk,βk+1), θk,βk+1) is weakly decreasing in θi. Since gk(αk−1(θk,βk+1), θk,βk+1) is
defined as the winning probability of k with the given parameters, when θi is raised to
θ′i > θi, in order to keep gk(αk−1(θ
′
k,β
′
k+1), θ
′
k,β
′
k+1) = x(k) = gk(αk−1(θk,βk+1), θk,βk+1),
we require θ′k ≥ θk. By applying the induction hypothesis twice, once for θi and once for θk,
all entries of αk−1(θk,βk+1) weakly increase. Therefore, all entries of αk(βk+1) are weakly
increasing in all θi for i > k.
• To prove the second part of the inductive step, recall that gt(βk+1) = gt(αk(βk+1),βk+1) =
gt(hk(βk+1),βk+1). For t ≤ k, gt(βk+1) = x(t) is a constant, and in particular weakly
decreasing in θi. Consider some t > k, i > k, t 6= i. First, hk(βk+1) is weakly increasing in θi
by the first part of the induction hypothesis. By the second part of the induction hypothesis,
gt(θk,βk+1) is weakly decreasing in all of its variables except θt, so substituting θk = hk(βk+1)
shows that gt(hk(βk+1),βk+1) is weakly decreasing in θi.
Proof of Part 2 of Lemma 11. Recall that t ≥ k. To show that gt(βk) is strictly increasing
in θt, we will show that at least one type i ≥ k has gi(βk) strictly decreasing in θt. By Part 1
of the lemma, each gi(βk) for i ≥ k is weakly decreasing in θt. By definition, αk−1(βk) ensures
that the first k equations of the system (4)-(5) are satisfied; this implies that
∑
j≥k f(j)gj(βk) =∑
j≥k f(j)x(j). Thus, if at least one of the gi(βk) is strictly decreasing in θt, to keep the summation∑
j≥k f(j)gj(βk) unchanged, gt(βk) must increase strictly in θt. We consider two possible cases for
S, as permitted by the assumption of the lemma:
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• S is not tight. In this case, we first show that h0(θS) is a strictly increasing function of
θt. Consider the primitive-roll coupling for θ
′
t > θt. For any primitive rolls v, the number
of winners will not decrease when θt increases to θ
′
t. Thus, we can bound the summation∑
i∈S f(i)gi(τ,θS) ≤
∑
i∈S f(i)gi(τ,θ
′
S). Because S is not tight, with non-zero probability, v
is such that viθi−τ < 0 for all i. And because v is drawn from a continuous distribution, with
positive probability, vtθ
′
t− τ > 0 as well. In that case, t is the only candidate with a positive
die roll. This implies that
∑
i∈S f(i)gi(τ,θS) <
∑
i∈S f(i)gi(τ,θ
′
S). Because h0(θ
′
S) is defined
as the unique τ satisfying the equation
∑
i∈S f(i)gi(τ,θ
′
S) =
∑
i∈S f(i)x(i), we obtain that
h0(θ
′
S) > h0(θS).
Now consider any primitive rolls v under which a type i 6= t wins, and v is such that
viθi − h0(θS) > 0 but viθi − h0(θ′S) < 0. Such rolls v must occur with positive probability,
because all the dice are fully supported over (0,∞). In that case, i is no longer a winning
type under θ′S . Thus gi(θS) is strictly decreasing in θt.
• There is more than one candidate, i.e., there is a type i with ν(i) 6= ν(t).
– If there is such a type i ≥ k with ν(i) 6= ν(t), then gi(βk) is strictly decreasing in θt by
the second part of Lemma 12.
– Otherwise, all types t′ ≥ k have ν(t′) = ν(t). Define β′k = βk for all entries except
type t, where it equals θ′t > θt. Consider a type i < k with ν(i) 6= ν(t). By definition
of αk−1(·), we get that gi(β′k) = x(i) = gi(βk). And by the first part of Lemma 12,
gi(αk−1(βk),βk) > gi(αk−1(βk),β
′
k). So i wins with strictly higher probability under
the parameters (αk−1(β
′
k),β
′
k) than under the parameters (αk−1(βk),β
′
k). As shown in
Part 1 of Lemma 11, gi(θS) is weakly decreasing in all of its variable except θi. Thus, the
only way that the winning probability of agent i can increase is for the ith component
of αk−1(β
′
k) to be strictly greater than the i
th component of αk−1(βk).
Finally, consider some type t′ ≥ k, t′ 6= t with ν(t′) = ν(t) 6= ν(i). Because all compo-
nents of αk−1(·k) weakly increase going from βk to β′k, and the ith component strictly
increases, we get that gt′(βk) < gt′(β
′
k). Thus, we have shown that there is a t
′ 6= t such
that gt′(βk) is strictly decreasing in θt.
Proof of Lemma 12. We prove both statements using primitive-roll coupling. For the sec-
ond part of the lemma, notice that when θi is increased to θ
′
i for i ≥ k, all components of
αk−1(βk) weakly increase. Thus, all components of (αk−1(βk),βk) are weakly larger than those
of (αk−1(β
′
k),β
′
k), and θ
′
i > θi, while θ
′
t = θt. Thus, we can apply primitive-roll coupling in both
cases.
Since the matroid is non-separable, there is a circuit C that contains ν(t) and ν(i). Under the
parameter vector θS , with non-zero probability (over primitive rolls v), the candidates in C get the
highest rolls, ν(t) (barely) wins with the second-lowest roll, and ν(i) gets the lowest roll among all
candidates in C and does not win. When θi increases to θ
′
i, with non-zero probability, the scaled
roll for type t becomes the lowest so that t ceases to be a winner. Combining this with Part 1
of Lemma 11 (which states that gt(θS) is weakly decreasing in θi), we have that gt(θS) is strictly
decreasing in θi.
To generalize Lemma 9 to arbitrary sets of types, we will need a construction that allows us
to “scale” the faces of some dice such that they will always be above/below the faces of another
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set of newly introduced dice; such a construction will allow us to give dice for types in barrier sets
higher faces than other dice. For the types of full-support distributions over [0,∞) we have been
using so far, this would be impossible. There is a simple mapping that guarantees our desired
properties: we map faces from (0,∞) to the set (1, 2) by mapping all positive s 7→ 2 − 11+s , and
mapping all negative s to −1. Notice that the new dice implement the same interim rule as the
old ones: in matroid environments, the set maximizing the sum of die rolls is determined by the
greedy algorithm, and hence, only the relative order between die faces matters. With the help of
this mapping, we prove the following lemma, similar to Lemma 9.
Lemma 13 Let x > 0 be a feasible interim rule within a winner-selection environment (f,M),
where M is a non-separable matroid. Fix a tight set S, and let Ŝ be a minimal tight set that
includes S as a proper subset, if such a set exists; otherwise let Ŝ = T . Given dice D = (Dt)t∈S
that implement xS in (f,M|S), there are dice D′ = (D′t)t∈Ŝ which implement xŜ in (f,M|Ŝ).
Proof. First, we define the dice D′t for types t ∈ S: they are obtained by applying the trans-
formation described previously to the corresponding dice Dt. Thus, the range of positive faces is
(1, 2) for these D′t.
For types t ∈ Ŝ \ S, we construct new dice D′t in a similar way to the proof of Lemma 9. The
construction is essentially identical, but all positive die faces s are mapped to 1− 11+s . Notice that
this mapping ensures that all die faces are strictly less than 1, and hence, these types t will always
lose to types t′ ∈ S. The main other change in the proof is to change the definition of gt(τ,θŜ\S):
it is now the interim winning probability of the type t ∈ S′ when winners are selected with the die
rolls D′, assuming all types outside Ŝ always get negative die rolls.
None of the monotonicity properties of the functions gt(·) will be affected under this new defini-
tion; thus, the same proof will go through, with only a slight change in the limits of f(k)gk(θk,βk+1):
lim
θk→∞
f(k)gk(θk,βk+1) ∈ {
∑
t≥k
f(t)x(t), R(A ∪ {k}) −
∑
t∈A
f(t)x(t)}
lim
θk→0
f(k)gk(θk,βk+1) ∈ {0,
∑
t≥k
f(t)x(t)−
R(A)− ∑
t∈A\B
f(t)x(t)
}.
Proof of Theorem 7. First consider the case when M is non-separable. Let T be the type set
with m types. We define the dice system as follows: First, for all types t with x(t) = 1, assign them
a point distribution (single-sided die) at 2, so they always win. Next, for all types t with x(t) = 0,
assign them a point distribution at −1, so they never win. Next, we create dice for barrier sets
S according to Lemma 9. Then, starting from the barrier sets, we repeatedly apply Lemma 13 to
construct dice for larger tight sets Ŝ ) S (or all of T ) implementing x
Ŝ
.
If M is separable, let M1, . . . ,Mk be the components of M. Using the construction from the
previous paragraph for each Mj , let Dj be the dice set constructed for Mj . Since there is no
circuit containing two candidates from different components, the winner set of one component has
no effect on the winner set of any other component. Thus, the union
⋃k
j=1Dj of dice implements
the desired interim rule.
3.2 Winner-Selecting Dice with polynomially many faces
The proof is based on the following generalization of the fundamental theorem of linear program-
ming to uncountable dimensions.
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Theorem 14 (Theorem B.11 from [13]) Let f1, . . . , fm : X → R be Borel measurable on a
measurable space X, and let µ be a probability measure on X such that fi is integrable with respect
to µ for each i = 1, . . . ,m. Then, there exists a probability measure ϕ on X with finite support,
such that ∫
X
fidϕ =
∫
X
fidµ
for all i. Moreover, there is such a ϕ whose support consists of at most m+ 1 points.
Proof of Theorem 6. Theorem 7 establishes that there is a vector of probability measures D =
(Dt)t∈T over V = (1, 2) ∪ {−1}, satisfying the following for all i and ti ∈ Ti:∫
V
∑
t∈T−i
∏
j 6=i
f(tj)
∫
· · ·
∫
V n−1
wti(s1, . . . , sn)dDt1(s1) · · · dDtn(sn)dDti(si) = x(ti). (6)
where wti(s1, . . . , sn) equals 1 if type ti is a winning type with dice rolls s1, . . . , sn, and equals 0
otherwise.
For a fixed type t∗ ∈ Ti and an equation corresponding to (j, t′j), we can change the order of
integration to make dDt∗ the outermost integral, and isolate the terms that do not involve dDt∗ .
Specifically, we define
qj,t′j(si) =
∑
t∈T
tj=t′j ,ti=t
∗
∏
k 6=j
f(tk)
∫
· · ·
∫
V n−1
wtj (s1, . . . , sn)dDt1(s1) · · · dDtn(sn)
to be the inner integral over distributions of t 6= t∗, as a function of si, and
cj,t′j =

0, for t′j = t
∗∫
V
∑
t∈T−j ,ti 6=t∗
∏
k 6=j
f(tk)
∫
· · ·
∫
V n−1
wtj (s1, . . . , sn)
dDt1(s1) · · · dDtn(sn)dDtj (sj), for t′j 6= t∗
as the component of the integral that does not have dDt∗ involved. Thus, Equation (6) can be
rewritten as ∫
V
qj,t′j(si)dDt
∗(si) + cj,t′j = x(t
′
j).
By Theorem 14, Dt∗ can be changed to a measure D
′
t∗ with support of size m+1, such that for all
j and tj ∈ Tj , ∫
V
qj,tj(si)dDt∗(si) =
∫
V
qj,tj(si)dD
′
t∗(si).
In other words, we can replace Dt∗ with D
′
t∗ , which has at most m + 1 faces. Applying the same
procedure to each type t∗ in turn, all dice can be replaced by dice with at most m+ 1 faces.
4 Efficient Construction of Dice for Single-Winner Environments
In the preceding section, we proved the existence of winner-selecting dice by a “construction.”
However, the construction involves repeated appeals to the Intermediate Value Theorem, and is
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thus inherently non-computational. It is certainly not clear how to implement it efficiently. In this
section, we show that when the matroid M is 1-uniform, i.e., at most one winner can be selected,
winner-selecting dice can be computed efficiently. We prove the following.
Theorem 15 Consider a winner-selection environment with n candidates, where each candidate
i’s type is drawn independently from a prior fi supported on Ti, and at most one winner can be
selected. If x is a feasible interim rule for f = f1 × · · · × fn, an explicit representation of the
associated dice can be computed in time polynomial in n and m =
∑
i |Ti|.
We use the same notation f(t) and x(t) as in Section 3. In the single-winner setting, the function
R(S) = Et∼f [rM(t ∩ S)] can be treated as a natural extension of f to subsets of T : given S ⊆ T ,
we let R(S) = f(S) = 1−∏ni=1(1−∑t∈Si f(t)), which is the probability that at least one type in S
shows up. Border’s constraints can then be written as follows:
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t) ≤ f(S) for all S ⊆ T.
The slack function becomes σf,x(S) = f(S) −
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t) and is nonnegative everywhere when
x is feasible.
Tight sets and barrier sets are defined as the special case of the definition for general matroids
in Section 3. The algorithm Find Barrier Set, given as Algorithm 1, simply implements the
definition of barrier sets as minimal non-empty tight sets, and therefore correctly computes a
barrier set.
ALGORITHM 1: Find Barrier Set(f,x)
1 T+ ← {t ∈ T : f(t)x(t) > 0}.
2 Define g(S) = f(S)−∑t∈S f(t)x(t) for S ⊆ T+.
3 if min {g(S) : ∅ ( S ⊆ T+} 6= 0 then
4 return T+.
5 else
6 T ∗ ← T+.
7 while there is a type t ∈ T ∗ such that min {g(S) : ∅ ( S ⊆ T ∗ \ {t}} = 0 do T ∗ ← T ∗ \ {t}.
8 return T ∗.
The following lemma characterizes the key useful structure of barrier sets for the single-winner
setting.
Lemma 16 Let f and x be such that x is feasible for f . If there are multiple barrier sets for
(f,x), then there is a candidate i∗ such that each barrier set is a singleton {t} with t ∈ Ti∗.
In other words, either there is a unique barrier set, or all barrier sets are singletons of types
from a single candidate.
Proof. Let A,B be any two barrier sets. Because A and B are both tight, the lattice property
of tight sets implies that A ∩B = ∅.
We first show that there is a candidate i∗ with A ⊆ Ti∗ and B ⊆ Ti∗ . Suppose not for
contradiction; then, there exist i 6= j and types ti ∈ A ∩ Ti and tj ∈ B ∩ Tj . With non-zero
probability, the types ti and tj show up at the same time. However, according to the definition of a
tight set, when a type in A shows up, the winner must be a candidate with type in A, and the same
must hold for B. Then, the winner’s type would have to be in A ∩ B with non-zero probability.
This contradicts the disjointness of A and B.
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It remains to show that all barrier sets are singletons. Since A is tight and all types in A belong
to the same candidate,
∑
t∈A f(t)x(t) = f(A) =
∑
t∈A f(t). Hence, x(t) = 1 for all t ∈ A, and
because barrier sets are minimally tight, A must be a singleton.
4.1 Description of the Algorithm
Given a prior f and a feasible interim rule x, the recursive procedure Contruct Dice, shown in
Algorithm 2, returns a family of dice D implementing x for f . It operates as follows. There are
two simple base cases: when no candidate ever wins, and when a single type of a single candidate
always wins. In the recursive case, the algorithm carefully selects a type t∗ and awards its die the
highest-valued face M ′. It assigns this new face a probability as large as possible, subject to still
permitting implementation of x. We choose t∗ as a member of a barrier set; this is important in
order to guarantee that the algorithm makes significant progress.
The subroutine Decrement, shown as Algorithm 3, essentially conditions both f and x on
the face M ′ not winning. Specifically, Decrement computes the conditional type distribution f ′,
and an interim rule x′, such that if there were a dice implementation of x′ for f ′, then adding M ′
to the die of t∗ would yield a set of dice implementing x for f .
ALGORITHM 2: Contruct Dice (f,x)
Input : PDFs f1, . . . , fn supported on disjoint type sets T1, . . . , Tn.
Input : Interim rule x feasible for f .
Output : Vector of dice (Dt)t∈
⊎
n
i=1
Ti .
1 Let T =
⊎
i Ti.
2 Let T+i = {t ∈ Ti : fi(t)xi(t) > 0}, and let T+ =
⊎n
i=1 T
+
i .
3 if T+ = ∅ then
4 for all types t ∈ T , let Dt be a single-sided die with a −1 face.
5 else if there is a type t∗ ∈ T+ with f(t∗)x(t∗) = 1 then
6 Let Dt∗ be a single-sided die with a +1 face.
7 for all other types t ∈ T \ {t∗}, let Dt be a single-sided die with a −1 face.
8 else
9 Let T ∗ = Find Barrier Set(f,x).
10 Let t∗ ∈ T ∗ be a type chosen arbitrarily.
11 Let (f ′,x′) = Decrement(f,x, t∗, q∗), for the largest value of q∗ ∈ [0, f(t∗)x(t∗)] such that x′ is
feasible for f ′. /* Note that f(t∗)x(t∗) < 1. */
12 Let (D′t)t∈T ← Contruct Dice(f ′,x′).
13 Let M be the maximum possible face of any die D′t, and M
′ := max(M, 0) + 1.
14 Let Dt = D
′
t for all types t 6= t∗.
15 Let Dt∗ be the die which rolls M
′ with probability q
∗
f(t∗) , and D
′
t∗ with probability 1− q
∗
f(t∗) .
16 return (Dt)t∈T .
We now provide a formal analysis of our algorithm. Theorem 15 follows from Lemmas 17–19.
Lemma 17 If Contruct Dice terminates, it outputs dice implementing x for f .
Lemma 18 Contruct Dice terminates after at most m2 recursive calls. (Recall that m =∑
i |Ti|.)
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ALGORITHM 3: Decrement(f,x, t∗, q)
/* q ≥ 0 is the probability allocated to the highest face. Because it is a contribution
to the unconditional winning probability f(t∗)x(t∗) of type t∗, and we separated out the
case that a single type has unconditional winning probability 1, q satisfies
q ≤ f(t∗)x(t∗) < 1. */
1 if q = f(t∗), then let f ′(t∗)← 0 and x′(t∗)← 0
2 else let f ′(t∗)← f(t∗)−q1−q and x′(t∗)← f(t
∗)x(t∗)−q
f(t∗)−q .
3 Let i∗ be such that t∗ ∈ Ti∗ .
4 for all t ∈ Ti∗ , t 6= t∗, let f ′(t)← f(t)1−q and x′(t)← x(t).
5 for all t ∈ T \ Ti∗ , let f ′(t)← f(t) and x′(t)← x(t)1−q .
6 return (f ′,x′).
Lemma 19 Excluding the recursive call, each invocation of Contruct Dice can be implemented
in time polynomial in n and m.
4.2 Proof of Lemma 17 (Correctness)
We prove the lemma by induction over the algorithm’s calls. Correctness is obvious for the two
base cases: when T+ = ∅ (no type should win), and when there exists a type t∗ with f(t∗)x(t∗) = 1
(t∗ always shows up and should always win). For the inductive step, suppose that the recursive
call in step 12 returns dice D′ = (D′t)t∈T , correctly implementing x′ for f ′, and let D = (Dt)t∈T be
the new dice defined in steps 14 and 15.
We analyze the interim winning probability of each type when using the dice-based winner
selection rule given by D. For each type t, let vt ∼ Dt be a roll of the die for type t, and for each
i, let ti ∼ fi be a draw of a type; all vt and ti are mutually independent. In other words, we may
assume that the die of every type is rolled (including types that do not show up), then the type
profile is drawn independently. The winning type is then the type ti with largest positive vti ; if all
vti are negative, then no type wins.
Let t∗ ∈ Ti∗ be as defined in step 10. Let E be the event that i∗ has type t∗ and that vt∗ =M ′,
and let E be its complement. By independence of the random choices, the probability of E is
f(t∗) · q∗
f(t∗) = q
∗. Type t∗ always wins under the event E . Conditioned on E , each vt (including vt∗)
is distributed as a draw from D′t, the type vector t is distributed as a draw from f
′
1×· · ·×f ′n, and the
vt’s and t are mutually independent. By the inductive hypothesis, conditioned on E , each type t wins
with probability f ′(t)x′(t). Using the definition of f ′ and x′ from the Decrement subroutine, the
total winning probability for t∗ is q∗ ·1+(1−q∗)·f ′(t∗)x′(t∗) = q∗+(1−q∗)· f(t∗)x(t∗)−q∗1−q∗ = f(t∗)x(t∗).
For t 6= t∗, the total winning probability is q∗ · 0 + (1− q∗)f ′(t)x′(t) = (1− q∗) · f(t)x(t)1−q∗ = f(t)x(t).
Therefore, the interim winning probability for each type t is x(t), and the dice D implement x for
f .
4.3 Proof of Lemma 18 (Number of Recursive Calls)
The following lemma is essential in that it shows that invoking Decrement maintains feasibility
and tightness of sets.
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Lemma 20 Let f , x, t∗ and q be valid inputs for Decrement, and f ′, x′ the output of the call
to Decrement(f,x, t∗, q). Let S be any set of types with t∗ ∈ S. Then,
1. The Border constraint for S is satisfied for (f ′,x′) if and only if it is satisfied for (f,x).
2. The Border constraint for S is tight for (f ′,x′) if and only if it is tight for (f,x).
Proof. We will show that the slack for every S ∋ t∗ satisfies σf ′,x′(S) = σf,x(S)1−q , which implies
both claims. Let i∗ be such that t∗ ∈ Ti∗ . Using the definitions of f ′ and x′,
σf ′,x′(S) = f
′(S)−
∑
t∈S
f ′(t)x′(t)
= 1−
(
1− f(Si∗)− q
1− q
)
·
∏
i 6=i∗
(1− f(Si))−
(
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t))− q
1− q
=
1
1− q ·
1− (1− f(Si∗)) ·∏
i 6=i∗
(1− f(Si))−
∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t)
 = σf,x(S)
1− q .
We are now ready to prove Lemma 18. We will show that with each recursive invocation of
Contruct Dice (step 12), at least one of the following happens: (1) The number of active types
|T+| decreases; (2) The size of the barrier set |T ∗| decreases.
Notice that the number of active types or the size of a barrier set never increase. Because the
size of the barrier set can only decrease at most m times, the number of active types must decrease
at least every m recursive invocations. It, too, can decrease at most m times, implying the claim
of the lemma.
Let T ∗, t∗, and (q∗, f ′,x′) be as chosen in steps 9, 10, and 11, respectively. Let candidate i∗ be
such that t∗ ∈ Ti∗ . If q∗ = f(t∗)x(t∗), then the type t∗ will be inactive in (f ′,x′), and there will be
one fewer active type in the subsequent invocation of Contruct Dice (step 12). We distinguish
the cases |T ∗| = 1 and |T ∗| > 1.
If |T ∗| = 1, then T ∗ = {t∗}. By definition of a barrier set, T ∗ is tight, implying (for a singleton
set) that x(t∗) = 1. We claim that q∗ is set to f(t∗) = f(t∗)x(t∗) in step 11, implying that the
number of active types decreases. To prove that q∗ = f(t∗), we will show that this choice of q∗
is feasible in the invocation of Decrement(f,x, t∗, f(t∗)). Consider the f̂ , x̂ resulting from such
an invocation of Decrement. Lemma 20 implies that the feasibility of each Border constraint
corresponding to a set S ∋ t∗ is preserved for (f̂ , x̂). For type sets S excluding t∗,
σ
f̂ ,x̂
(S) =f̂(S)−
∑
t∈S
f̂(t)x̂(t) = 1−
(
1− f(Si∗)
1− f(t∗)
)
·
∏
i 6=i∗
(1− f(Si))−
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t)
1− f(t∗)
=
1
1− f(t∗) ·
(
1− (1− f(Si∗) + f(t∗)) ·
∏
i 6=i∗
(1− f(Si))
−
(∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t) + f(t∗)x(t∗)
))
=
σf,x(S ∪ {t∗})
1− f(t∗) ,
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which is nonnegative because x is feasible for f . Therefore, step 11 indeed chooses q∗ = f(t∗).
Next, we consider the case |T ∗| > 1, and assume that q∗ < f(t∗)x(t∗) (since otherwise, we are
done). Then, the set of active types T+ is the same for both (f,x) and (f ′,x′).
If the instance (f ′,x′) for the recursive call has multiple barrier sets, then by Lemma 16, they
are all singletons, and indeed the size of the barrier set in the next recursive call (which is 1) is
strictly smaller than |T ∗|. So we assume that (f ′,x′) has a unique barrier set T ′.
Because |T ∗| > 1, Lemma 16 implies that T ∗ is the unique barrier set for (f,x). Therefore,
by the definition of barrier sets, T ∗ (and hence also t∗) is contained in every tight set of active
types for (f,x) (if any). Because t∗ is contained in all tight sets, Lemma 20 implies that for every
q ∈ [0, f(t∗)x(t∗)], the result of Decrement(f,x, t∗, q) does not violate any constraints which are
already tight for (f,x), and in fact preserves their tightness.
Because all other constraints have slack, the optimal q∗ is strictly positive. By assumption,
we also have that q∗ < f(t∗)x(t∗); therefore, a non-empty set S′ which was not tight for (f,x)
must have become tight for (f ′,x′) = Decrement(f,x, t∗, q∗). By Lemma 20, this set S′ does not
include t∗. Because discarding inactive types preserves tightness, we may assume without loss of
generality that S′ ⊆ T+.
We have shown the existence of a non-empty tight set S′ ⊆ T+ \{t∗} for (f ′,x′). By definition,
the barrier set T ′ is the (unique, in our case) minimal tight set for (f ′,x′), so T ′ ⊆ S′. We
distinguish two cases, based on the possible definitions of barrier sets:
• If T ∗ = T+, then because S′ ( T+ = T ∗, the barrier set T ′ is strictly smaller than T ∗.
• If T ∗ is tight for (f,x), then it is also tight for (f ′,x′) by Lemma 20; since both S′ and T ∗
are tight for (f ′,x′), we get that T ′ ⊆ T ∗ ∩ S′ ⊆ T ∗ \ {t∗} is strictly smaller than T ∗.
4.4 Proof of Lemma 19 (Runtime per Call)
There are only two steps for which polynomial runtime is not immediate: the computation of q∗
in step (11) of Contruct Dice, and finding a non-empty minimizer of a submodular function in
steps (3) and (7) of Find Barrier Set. We prove polynomial-time implementability of both steps
in the following lemmas.
Lemma 21 In step 11 of Contruct Dice, q∗ can be computed in poly(m) time.
Proof. Let f , x, and t∗ be as in step 11, and let the candidate i∗ be such that t∗ ∈ Ti∗ . For
each q ∈ [0, f(t∗)x(t∗)] ⊆ [0, 1), let (fq,xq) = Decrement(f,x, t∗, q) be the result of running
Decrement(f,x, t∗, q) with parameter q. Lemma 20 implies that all Border constraints for S ∋ t∗
remain feasible for (fq,xq). For type sets S 6∋ t∗, we can write the slack in the corresponding Border
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constraint as a function of q as follows:
σfq ,xq(S) = fq(S)−
∑
t∈S
fq(t)xq(t)
= 1−
(
1− f(Si∗)
1− q
)
·
∏
i 6=i∗
(1− f(Si))−
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t)
1− q
=
1
1− q ·
1− (1− f(Si∗)− q) ·∏
i 6=i∗
(1− f(Si))−
∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t)− q

=
1
1− q (σf,x(S)− qf(S \ Si∗)) .
The preceding expression is nonnegative if and only if q ≤ h(S) := σf,x(S)
f(S\Si∗ )
. Therefore, q∗ is the
minimum of f(t∗)x(t∗) and minS⊆T\{t∗} h(S). The function h(S) does not appear to be submodular,
and hence efficient minimization is not immediate. We utilize Theorem 4 to reduce the search space
and compute q∗ efficiently.
For an interim rule x : T → [0, 1], we call S ⊆ T a level set of x if there exists an α ∈ [0, 1]
such that S = {t ∈ T : x(t) > α}. If q∗ = minS 6∋t∗ h(S), then at least one Border constraint just
becomes tight at q = q∗. Theorem 4 implies that at least one level set of xq∗ corresponds to one of
these newly tightened constraints, and h is minimized by such a level set. It follows that, in order
to compute q∗, it suffices to minimize h over all those sets S 6∋ t∗ which could possibly arise as level
sets of some xq for q ∈ [0, f(t∗)x(t∗)].
Let t1, . . . , tK be the types in Ti∗ \ {t∗}, ordered by non-increasing x(t); similarly, let t′1, . . . , t′L
be the types in T \ Ti∗ , ordered by non-increasing x(t). The relative order of types in Ti∗ \ {t∗}
is the same under xq(t) as under x(t), because xq(t) = x(t); similarly, the relative order of types
in T \ Ti∗ is the same under xq(t) as under x(t), because xq(t) = x(t)1−q . Therefore, the family
{{t1, . . . , tk, t′1, . . . , t′ℓ} : k ≤ K, ℓ ≤ L} includes all level sets of every xq excluding t∗. There are at
most m2 type sets in this family, and those sets can be enumerated efficiently to minimize h.
Lemma 22 There is an algorithm for computing a non-empty minimizer of a submodular function
in the value oracle model, with runtime polynomial in the size of the ground set.
Proof. For a submodular function g : 2T → R, let gt(S) = g(S ∪ {t}), for t ∈ T . gt is also
submodular, and can be minimized in time polynomial in |T | [10]. Let St be a minimizer of gt and
t∗ ∈ argmint∈T gt(St). St∗ ∪ {t∗} is a non-empty minimizer of g.
5 Symmetric Dice For I.I.D. Candidates in Single-Winner Settings
Even when the candidates are identical and the interim rule is symmetric, Algorithm 2 typically
produces different dice for different candidates. In this section, we design an algorithm specifically
for the case of n ≥ 2 i.i.d. candidates that guarantees symmetry across candidates in the dice-based
implementation.
Theorem 23 Consider a winner-selection environment with n candidates, where each candidate
has types T , each candidate’s type is drawn independently from the prior f on T , and at most
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one candidate is selected as winner. If x : T → [0, 1] is a feasible symmetric interim rule, then
it admits a symmetric dice-based implementation. An explicit representation of the associated dice
can be computed in time polynomial in n and m = |T |.
Algorithm 4, which is similar to Algorithm 2, recursively constructs a dice-based implementation
for the symmetric interim rule x.
ALGORITHM 4: Contruct Symmetric Dice(n, f,x)
Input : Number of candidates n ≥ 2.
Input : PDF f supported on T .
Input : Symmetric interim rule x : T → [0, 1] feasible for fn.
Output : Set of dice (Dt)t∈T .
1 Let T+ ← {t | f(t)x(t) > 0} be the set of active types.
2 if |T+| ≤ 1 then
3 for all t ∈ T \T+, let Dt be a single-sided die with a −1 face.
4 for all t ∈ T+ (if any), let Dt be a die with two sides {−1, 1} and probability 1−
n
√
1−nf(t)x(t)
f(t) of
coming up 1.
5 else
6 Let T ∗ = Find Barrier Set IID(n, f,x) .
7 Let t∗ ∈ T ∗ be arbitrary.
8 Let (f ′,x′)← Decrement Symmetric Dice(n, f,x, t∗, q∗), for the largest value q∗ ∈ [0, f(t∗)] such
that x′ is feasible for f ′.
9 (D′t)t∈T ← Contruct Symmetric Dice(n, f ′,x′).
10 Let M be the maximum possible face of any D′t, and M
′ := max(M, 0) + 1.
11 Let Dt = D
′
t for t 6= t∗.
12 Let Dt∗ be the die which rolls M
′ with probability q
∗
f(t∗) , and rolls D
′
t∗ with probability 1− q
∗
f(t∗) .
13 return (Dt)t∈T .
ALGORITHM 5: Decrement Symmetric Dice(n, f,x, t∗, q)
/* As in the algorithm Decrement, q is the probability assigned to the highest face.
Unlike in the algorithm Decrement, due to symmetry, for any one candidate, the
probability of winning thanks to this highest face is only (1− (1 − q)n)/n. */
1 if f(t∗) = q, then let f ′(t∗)← 0, x′(t∗)← 0.
2 else let f ′(t∗)← f(t∗)−q1−q and x′(t∗)← f(t
∗)x(t∗)−(1−(1−q)n)/n
(f(t∗)−q)(1−q)n−1 . /* q < 1 because |T+| ≥ 2. */
3 for all t 6= t∗ do let f ′(t)← f(t)1−q and x′(t)← x(t)(1−q)n−1 .
4 return (f ′,x′).
Interim rule feasibility is characterized by the symmetric Border constraints (Inequality (2)).
We let σn,f,x(S) denote the slack in the symmetric Border constraint for S ⊆ T . Similarly to
Section 4, when x is feasible for (n, f), we call a set S ⊆ T tight for (n, f,x) if σn,f,x(S) = 0.
Also similar to Section 4, we let T+ = {t ∈ T : f(t)x(t) > 0} be the set of active types, and we
define the barrier sets to be the minimal non-empty tight sets of active types if any non-empty
tight sets exist; otherwise, T+ is the unique barrier set. The algorithm Find Barrier Set IID is
essentially identical to Find Barrier Set from Section 4; hence, we omit it here. The following
lemma shows that the barrier set is unique in the i.i.d. setting, and that therefore, every tight set
contains it.
22
Lemma 24 In the i.i.d. setting, there is a unique barrier set.
Proof. The uniqueness of the barrier set can be shown by a proof very similar to the proof of
Lemma 16. Assume for contradiction that there are two barrier sets A and B. Minimality implies
that A and B are disjoint. Since there are at least 2 candidates, with positive probability, at least
one candidate has a type in A and at least one candidate has a type in B. In this event, tightness
implies that the winner’s type must lie in both A and B, contradicting their disjointness.
We now sketch the proof of Theorem 23, which is very similar to that of Theorem 15.
Proof of Theorem 23. First, we show correctness. Assuming that the algorithm terminates,
we show that it outputs a set of dice implementing the symmetric rule x for fn.
In the base case |T+| ≤ 1, our choice of dice for types t /∈ T+ ensures that they are never
chosen as winner. If there is a (unique) type t ∈ T+, then the probability of its die rolling 1
is
1− n
√
1−nf(t)x(t)
f(t) . The probability that a particular candidate has type t and rolls 1 is therefore
1 − n√1− nf(t)x(t), and the probability that at least one candidate has type t and rolls 1 is
nf(t)x(t). Thus, the probability that some candidate has type t and wins is nf(t)x(t); by symmetry
and the uniform tie breaking rule, the probability that a specific candidate has type t and wins is
f(t)x(t).
For the inductive step, consider a recursive call to Contruct Symmetric Dice. Assume by
induction hypothesis that the dice collection (D′t)t∈T implements x
′ for (f ′)n, and consider the
winner selection rule implemented by the dice (Dt)t∈T for the joint type distribution f
n.
The probability of at least one candidate rolling the highest faceM ′ is 1−(1−q∗)n. Conditioned
on no candidate rolling the highest face M ′, the conditional type distribution of each candidate is
f ′, the conditional distribution of type t’s die is D′t, and all these distributions are independent.
The probability of a specific candidate winning with type t 6= t∗ is (1− q∗)nf ′(t)x′(t) = f(t)x(t).
Next consider the winning probability for type t∗. There are two ways in which a candidate with
type t∗ could win: by rolling the highest face M ′ and winning the uniformly random tie breaking
if necessary, or by having the highest face when no candidate rolls the face M ′. Similar to the
argument in the base case, the probability that some candidate wins by rollingM ′ is (1−(1−q∗)n),
so the probability that a specific candidate wins by rolling M ′ is 1
n
(1− (1− q∗)n). The probability
of winning without rolling the highest face is (1 − q∗)nf ′(t∗)x′(t∗). In total, the probability of a
specific candidate winning with type t∗ is 1
n
(1 − (1− q∗)n) + (1 − q∗)nf ′(t∗)x′(t∗) = f(t∗)x(t∗), so
for all types t, the interim winning probability of each type t is x(t), as claimed.
Next, we bound the number of iterations by m2. As before, we show that with each recursive
call, either the size of the unique barrier set decreases, or the number of active types decreases.
The following equation captures the key part of the analogue of Lemma 20, showing that invoking
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Decrement Symmetric Dice(n, f,x, t∗, q) preserves slackness and tightness of every set S ∋ t∗.
σn,f ′,x′(S) = 1−
(
1−
∑
t∈S
f ′(t)
)n
− n
∑
t∈S
f ′(t)x′(t)
= 1−
(
1−
∑
t∈S f(t)− q
1− q
)n
− n ·
∑
t∈S f(t)x(t)− (1− (1− q)n)/n
(1− q)n
=
1
(1− q)n ·
(
(1− q)n −
(
1−
∑
t∈S
f(t)
)n
− n
∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t) + (1− (1− qn))
)
=
σn,f,x(S)
(1− q)n .
Now consider a call to Contruct Symmetric Dice. There are again two cases, based on the
cardinality of the barrier set T ∗. If |T ∗| > 1, then either q∗ = f(t∗), and the number of active types
obviously decreases, or q∗ < f(t∗), and a new tight set is created in step (8). In the latter case, the
size of the barrier set decreases in the next recursive call; as in the proof of Lemma 18, this follows
from the uniqueness of the barrier set (Lemma 24), the fact that Decrement Symmetric Dice
preserves tightness and slackness of sets containing the type t∗ (including, in particular, the tight
set T ∗), and the fact that tight sets are closed under intersection.
If T ∗ = {t∗} is a singleton, then tightness implies that nf(t∗)x(t∗) = 1 − (1 − f(t∗))n. The
following calculation then shows that invoking Decrement Symmetric Dice(n, f,x, t∗, q) with
q = f(t∗) does not violate the feasibility of any set S 6∋ t∗.
σn,f ′,x′(S) = 1−
(
1−
∑
t∈S
f ′(t)
)n
− n
∑
t∈S
f ′(t)x′(t)
= 1−
(
1−
∑
t∈S f(t)
1− q
)n
− n
∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t)
(1− q)n
=
1
(1− q)n ·
(
(1− q)n −
(
1− q −
∑
t∈S
f(t)
)n
− n
∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t)
)
=
1
(1− q)n
(
1−
(
1− f(t∗)−
∑
t∈S
f(t)
)n
− n
∑
t∈S
f(t)x(t)− (1− (1− f(t∗))n)
)
=
σn,f,x(S ∪ {t∗})
(1− q)n ≥ 0.
Because feasibility is also preserved for sets S ∋ t∗ (as mentioned above), this implies that q∗ =
f(t∗); as a result, the number of active types decreases.
Finally, it remains to show that each recursive call can be implemented in time polynomial in
n and m. For step (6), the proof is essentially identical to the analogous claim in Section 4 and
is therefore omitted. For computing q∗ in Step (8), the proof is similar to the analogous claim
in Section 4. Let (fq,xq) = Decrement Symmetric Dice(n, f,x, t
∗, q); as shown above, this
operation preserves the feasibility of every constraint corresponding to S ∋ t∗. For sets S 6∋ t∗,
there exists a threshold h(S) for the maximum value of q ≤ f(t∗)x(t∗) such that σn,fq,xq (S) ≥ 0,
and this threshold can be computed numerically. As in the proof of Lemma 19, Theorem 4 implies
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that it suffices to restrict attention to level sets of the form S(α) = {t 6= t∗ : xq(t) > α} for some
q ∈ [0, f(t∗)] and α ∈ [0, 1].
In the i.i.d. setting, there are at most m − 1 such level sets, since the relative order of types
t 6= t∗ by xq(t) does not depend on q (and hence, can be computed from x). As in the proof of
Lemma 19, computing q∗ then reduces to minimizing h(S) over these m− 1 level sets.
6 FromWinner-Selecting Dice to Interim Rules for Single-Winner
Settings
Having shown how to compute winner-selecting dice implementing a given interim rule, we next
show the easier converse direction: how to compute the interim rule given winner-selecting dice
{Di,t} in single-winner environments. As before, we denote the type set of candidate i by Ti,
and assume without loss of generality that the type sets of different candidates are disjoint. For
simplicity of exposition, we assume that each die has a given finite support6, and we write Ui :=⋃
t∈Ti
supp(Di,t) for the combined support of candidate i’s dice. We also assume that we can
evaluate the probability Pr[Di,t = u] of the face labeled with u, for all candidates i, types t, and
faces u ∈ Ui.
Theorem 25 Consider a single-winner selection environment with n candidates and independent
priors f1, . . . , fn, where fi is supported on Ti. Given dice {Di,t | i ∈ [n], t ∈ Ti} represented
explicitly, the interim rule of the corresponding dice-based winner selection rule can be computed in
time polynomial in n, m =
∑
i |Ti|, and the total support size |
⋃
i Ui| of all the dice.
Proof. First, we can compute the probability mass function of each candidate i’s (random) score
vi. Given u ∈ Ui, we have Pr[vi = u] =
∑
t∈Ti
fi(t) ·Pr[Di,t = u].
From this probability mass function, we easily compute Pr[vi ≤ u] for each u ∈ Ui by the
appropriate summation. When all dice faces are distinct, this is all we need; since Pr[vi′ < u] =
Pr[vi′ ≤ u] for i′ 6= i and u ∈ Ui, the interim rule is given by the following simple equation:
xi(t) =
∑
u∈supp(Di,t)
Pr[Di,t = u] ·
∏
i′ 6=i
Pr[vi′ ≤ u].
When the dice’s faces are not distinct, recall that we break ties uniformly at random. To
account for the contribution of this tie-breaking rule, we need the distribution of the number of
other candidates that tie candidate i’s score of u; this is a Poisson Binomial distribution. More,
precisely, we need the Poisson Binomial distribution with the n− 1 parameters
(
Pr[vi′=u]
Pr[vi′≤u]
)
i′ 6=i
; we
denote its probability mass function by Bi,u. It is well known, and easy to verify, that a simple
dynamic program computes the probability mass function of a Poisson Binomial distribution in time
polynomial in its number of parameters. Therefore, we can compute Bi,u(k) for each i ∈ [n], u ∈ Ui
and k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. The interim rule is then given by the following equation:
xi(t) =
∑
u∈supp(Di,t)
Pr[Di,t = u] ·
∏
i′ 6=i
Pr[vi′ ≤ u]
 · n−1∑
k=0
Bi,u(k)
k + 1
.
It is easy to verify that all the above computations satisfy the claimed runtime.
6Our approach extends easily to the case of continuously supported dice, so long as we can perform integration
with respect to the distributions of the various dice.
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7 Winner-Selecting Dice and Persuasion
In this section, we investigate the existence of winner-selecting dice for instances of Bayesian persua-
sion. Our main result (Theorem 26) is to exhibit an instance with independent non-identical actions
for which there is no optimal signaling scheme that can be implemented using winner-selecting dice.
This result is contrasted with Theorem 27, which shows that when the actions’ types are not just
independent, but identically distributed as well, a dice-based implementation always does exist.
Theorem 26 There is an instance of Bayesian persuasion (given in Table 1) with independent
actions which does not admit a dice-based implementation of any optimal signaling scheme. Conse-
quently, there exists a second-order interim rule which does not admit a dice-based implementation.
Theorem 27 Every Bayesian persuasion instance with i.i.d. actions admits an optimal dice-based
signaling scheme. Moreover, when the prior type distribution is given explicitly, the corresponding
dice can be computed in time polynomial in the number of actions and types.
The negative result of Theorem 26 has interesting implications. Since second-order interim
rules summarize all the attributes of a winner selection rule relevant to persuasion, second-order
interim rules, unlike their first-order brethren, can in general not be implemented by dice. Most
importantly, this result draws a sharp contrast between persuasion and single-item auctions, despite
their superficial similarity: it rules out a Myerson-like virtual-value characterization of optimal
persuasion schemes, and it joins the #P-hardness result of [8] as evidence of the intractability of
optimal persuasion.
7.1 Basics of Bayesian Persuasion
In Bayesian persuasion, the n candidates are actions which a receiver can take. Each action i has
a type ti, drawn independently
7 from the set Ti, according to a commonly known distribution fi.
Each type ti has associated payoffs s(i, ti) and r(i, ti) for the sender and receiver, respectively. The
sender (or principal) also has access to the actual draws t = (t1, . . . , tn) of the types, and would
like to use this leverage to persuade the receiver to take an action favorable to him8.
Thereto, the sender can commit to a (typically randomized) policy A— called a signaling scheme
— of revealing some of this information to the receiver. It was shown by Kamenica and Gentzkow
[12] that the sender can restrict attention, without loss, to direct schemes: randomized functions
A mapping type profiles to recommended actions. Naturally, the function must be persuasive: if
action i is recommended, the receiver’s posterior expected utility from action i must be no less than
her posterior expected utility from any other action i′. In this sense, direct schemes can be viewed
as winner selection rules in which the actions are the candidates, and persuasiveness constraints
must be obeyed.
7.2 Proof of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 26. The persuasion instance, shown in Table 1, features three actions {A,B,C},
each of which has two types {1, 2}. The types of the different actions are distributed independently.
7The draws are independent in this paper. In more general Bayesian persuasion models, they can be correlated.
8To avoid ambiguities, we always use male pronouns for the sender and female ones for the receiver.
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In the instance, the sender’s utility from any particular action is a constant, independent of the
action’s type.
action
type
1 2
A 0.5× (100, 2) 0.5× (100,−∞)
B 0.99 × (1, 3) 0.01 × (1,−∞)
C 0.5 × (0, 0) 0.5× (0, 6)
Table 1: A Persuasion instance with no dice-based implementation. The notation p × (s, r) de-
notes that the type (s, r) (in which the sender and receiver payoffs are s and r, respectively) has
probability p.
One (optimal, as we will show implicitly) signaling scheme is the following. (In writing a type
vector, here and below, we use ∗ to denote that the type of an action is irrelevant.)
• If the type vector is (1, ∗, 1), then recommend action A.
• If the type vector is (1, ∗, 2), then recommend each of A,C with equal probability 12 .
• If the type vector is (2, 1, ∗), then recommend action B.
• If the type vector is (2, 2, ∗), then recommend action C.
While this is not the unique optimal scheme, we next prove that none of the optimal persuasion
schemes admit a dice-based implementation.
The given signaling scheme recommends action A with probability 3/8 overall, action B with
probability 99200 overall, and action C with the remaining probability. No persuasive signaling scheme
can recommend A with probability strictly more than 3/8, because conditioned on receiving the
recommendation A, action C must be at least twice as likely to be of type 1 as of type 2, in addition
to action A being of type 1 with probability 1. Similarly, no persuasive scheme can recommend B
with probability strictly more than 99200 , because action C must be at least as likely to be of type
1 as of type 2 when C is recommended, in addition to action B being of type 1 with probability
1. Hence, any optimal signaling scheme must recommend A with probability 3/8 and B with
probability 99200 , and the given scheme is in fact optimal.
Suppose for a contradiction that there exist dice (Di,j)i∈{A,B,C},j∈{1,2} implementing an optimal
signaling scheme. We gradually derive properties of these optimal signaling schemes, eventually
leading to a contradiction.
1. Since action A can never be recommended when it has type 2 (the receiver would never follow
the recommendation), it must be recommended with probability 34 conditioned on having type
1.
2. In particular, whenever the type profile is (1, ∗, 1), action A must be recommended, regardless
of the type of action B. This is because action C must be at least twice as likely of type 1 as
of type 2 for a recommendation of A to be persuasive.
3. Therefore, all faces on DA,1 must be larger than all faces on DB,1 and on DB,2.
4. Because of this, action B can never be recommended when the type profile is (1, ∗, 2).
5. Thus, when the type profile is (1, ∗, 2), the signaling scheme has to recommend each of A
and C with probability 12 . (The recommendation could of course follow different distributions
based on the type of B; such a correlation is immaterial for our argument.)
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6. Given that action B cannot be recommended when action A has type 1, or when action B
has type 2, it must always be recommended for type vectors (2, 1, ∗).
7. This implies that all faces of DB,1 must be larger than all faces on DC,1 and on DC,2.
8. This is a contradiction to Step 5, which states that with positive probability, DC,2 beats DB,1.
Thus, we have proved that there is no dice-based implementation of any optimal signaling
scheme for the given instance.
Proof of Theorem 27. When the actions’ (or more generally: candidates’) type distributions
are i.i.d., i.e., Ti and fi are the same for all candidates i, Dughmi and Xu [8] have shown that there
is an optimal symmetric signaling scheme, or more generally a symmetric second-order interim
rule X. We show that any symmetric second-order interim rule X is uniquely determined by its
first-order component, a fact implicit in [8].
For symmetric rules, xi,i′,t depends only on whether i = i
′ or i 6= i′, but not on the identities of
the candidates i and i′. Therefore, X can be equivalently described by two type-indexed vectors
y and z, where yt = xi,i,t for all candidates i, and zt = xi,i′,t for all candidates i and i
′ with i 6= i′.
The vector y is a first-order interim rule, and we refer to it as the first-order component of X. If
X is feasible and implemented by A, then yt = xi,i,t = Pr[A(t) = i | ti = t] for all candidates i, so
y is the first-order interim rule implemented by A. For every candidate i and type t, we have
1 =
n∑
i′=1
Pr[A(t) = i′ | ti = t] = (n − 1)zt + yt.
Therefore, z = 1−y
n−1 , and the first-order component of a symmetric second-order interim rule
suffices to fully describe it. The second-order rule is also, by the preceding argument, efficiently
computable from its first-order component, and is feasible if and only if its first-order component
is a feasible symmetric interim rule. Moreover, by [5], feasibility of symmetric second-order interim
rules can be checked in time polynomial in the number of types and candidates, and given a feasible
symmetric second-order interim rule X, a winner selection rule implementing X can be evaluated
in time polynomial in the number of types and candidates.
8 Directions for Future Work
We have begun an investigation of dice-based winner selection rules, in which each of several
candidates independently draws a “score” from a distribution (rolling a “die”), and a candidate
set is selected to maximize the sum of scores, subject to a feasibility constraint. We have shown
that dice-based winner selection rules can implement all first-order interim rules with matroid
constraints, but not all second-order interim rules; in particular, there are instances of Bayesian
persuasion in which no optimal signaling scheme can be implemented using dice.
A natural direction for future work is to understand the limits of dice-based winner selection
rules. While our existence proof uses matroid properties, matroid constraints are not the limit
of implementability by dice: in the appendix, we show an example in which the feasible sets do
not form a matroid, yet every feasible interim rule within the environment is implementable with
dice. This rules out a characterization of the form “a feasibility constraint I has all feasible (x, f)
implementable by dice if and only if I is a matroid.” In fact, we do not know of any feasibility
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constraint and corresponding first-order feasible interim rule for which a dice-based implementation
can be ruled out, though we strongly suspect that such examples exist. A difficulty in verifying our
conjecture is that we are not aware of a useful general technique for proving the non-existence of
a dice-based implementation for a given interim rule.
Another direction is to find an efficient algorithm for matroid environments. To derive an
efficient algorithm from our existential proof, the functions gt and ht would have to be evaluated
efficiently. Furthermore, even if a set of continuous dice is given, it is still unclear how to convert
them to dice with finitely many faces in polynomial time.
References
[1] Nibia Aires, Johan Jonasson, and Olle Nerman. Order sampling design with prescribed inclu-
sion probabilities. Scandinavian journal of statistics, 29(1):183–187, 2002.
[2] Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, and Azarakhsh Malekian. Bayesian
optimal auctions via multi-to single-agent reduction. In Proc. 13th ACM Conf. on Electronic
Commerce, page 17, 2012.
[3] Kim C. Border. Implementation of reduced form auctions: A geometric approach. Economet-
rica, 59(4):1175–1187, 1991.
[4] Kim C. Border. Reduced form auctions revisited. Economic Theory, 31(1):167–181, 2007.
[5] Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, and S. Matthew Weinberg. An algorithmic characteriza-
tion of multi-dimensional mechanisms. In Proc. 44th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing,
pages 459–478, 2012.
[6] Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Optimal multi-dimensional
mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization. In Proc. 53rd IEEE Symp. on
Foundations of Computer Science, pages 130–139, 2012.
[7] Shaddin Dughmi. Algorithmic information structure design: a survey. ACM SIGecom Ex-
changes, 15(2):2–24, 2017.
[8] Shaddin Dughmi and Haifeng Xu. Algorithmic bayesian persuasion. In Proc. 48th ACM Symp.
on Theory of Computing, pages 412–425, 2016.
[9] Parikshit Gopalan, Noam Nisan, and Tim Roughgarden. Public projects, boolean functions
and the borders of Border’s Theorem. In Proc. 16th ACM Conf. on Economics and Compu-
tation, page 395, 2015.
[10] Martin Gro¨tschel, La´szlo´ Lova´sz, and Alexander Schrijver. Geometric algorithms and combi-
natorial optimization, volume 2. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
[11] Jason D. Hartline. Mechanism design and approximation. Now Publishers, 2013.
[12] Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow. Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review,
101(6):2590–2615, 2011.
29
[13] Jean-Bernard Lasserre. Moments, positive polynomials and their applications, volume 1. World
Scientific, 2010.
[14] Eric Maskin and John Riley. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers. Econometrica, 52(6):
1473–1518, 1984.
[15] Steven A. Matthews. On the implementability of reduced form auctions. Econometrica, 52(6):
1519–1522, 1984.
[16] Konrad Mierendorff. Asymmetric reduced form auctions. Economics Letters, 110(1):41–44,
2011.
[17] Roger B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58–73,
1981.
[18] James G Oxley. Matroid theory, volume 3. Oxford University Press, USA, 2006.
[19] Mallesh M. Pai and Rakesh Vohra. Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers.
Journal of Economic Theory, 150:383–425, 2014.
[20] Bengt Rose´n. Asymptotic theory for order sampling. Journal of Statistical Planning and
Inference, 62(2):135–158, 1997.
[21] Hassler Whitney. On the abstract properties of linear dependence. American Journal of
Mathematics, 57(3):509–533, 1935.
30
A An Interim Rule not Corresponding to any Optimal Auction
According to [17, 3], the linear program which solves for the revenue-maximizing interim rule is
equivalent to the following LP:
Maximize
∑n
i=1
∑
t∈Ti
fi(t)xi(t)vi(t)
subject to x is a feasible interim rule.
Here vi is the (ironed) virtual value function. When no type has virtual value 0, every optimal
solution is at the boundary of the polytope of feasible interim rules. When some types have virtual
value 0, and we employ the convention of never awarding those types an item, again we get an
interim rule at the boundary. Therefore, any interior point of this polytope cannot arise as the
interim rule of any optimal auction. In particular, we have shown that there exist feasible interim
rules not arising as allocation rules of optimal auctions.
B A Non-Matroid Example Implementable by Dice
In this section, we show a non-matroid example for which all feasible first-order interim rules are
implementable by dice. Notice that finding one interim rule that is implementable by dice within
a given environment is easy: one can calculate the interim winning probability of a collection of
trivial winner-selecting dice. What we want is to show that dice exist for all feasible interim rules
of a non-matroid environment.
Consider a winner-selection environment with 4 candidates, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4. The feasible
winner sets are {1, 2}, {3, 4} and their subsets, i.e., all singletons and the empty set. Each candidate
has a single type, so the type distribution is trivial. We denote the unique type of candidate i by i.
Consider any ex-post rule, i.e., a distribution over the feasible sets {1, 2}, {3, 4}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, ∅.
Denote the ex-post rule’s probability of selecting the winner set S by yS . We have
x(1) = y{1,2} + y{1}
x(2) = y{1,2} + y{2}
x(3) = y{3,4} + y{3}
x(4) = y{3,4} + y{4}
(7)
Notice that any feasible interim rule can be implemented by a distribution y in this way.
Without loss of generality, assume that x(1) ≤ x(2) and x(3) ≤ x(4). Whenever x is feasible, we
define the following set of dice. Each die has −∞ on one side; the other side’s value and probability
are given by Table 2.
Type t 1 2 3 4
positive face 100 2 10 1
probability of
positive face
x(1) x(2)−x(1)1−x(1)−x(3)
x(3)
1−x(1)
x(4)−x(3)
1−x(2)−x(3)
Table 2: Dice for x
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One can easily verify that these dice implement the desired interim rule, if the given probabilities
for the positive face fall in the interval [0, 1]. Thus, we only need to verify that they do. Substituting
(7) into the probabilities from Table 2, we have
Type t 1 2 3 4
probability of
positive face
y{1,2} + y{1}
y{2}−y{1}
1−y{1,2}−y{1}−y{3,4}−y{3}
y{3,4}+y{3}
1−y{1,2}−y{1}
y{4}−y{3}
1−y{1,2}−y{2}−y{3,4}−y{3}
Since
∑
S⊆{1,2,3,4} yS = 1 and x(1) ≤ x(2), x(3) ≤ x(4), all the probabilities indeed fall in the
interval [0, 1]. Thus for any feasible interim rule x in this winner-selection environment, there is a
collection of dice implementing x.
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